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Abstract:  Consolidations and spin-offs in the agricultural biotechnology industry and
the growing links of multinational corporations with the food and feed industry has been
the subject of considerable discussion among academics, policy makers, consumers, and
farmers.  Most of the research by academic and government institutions has focused on
the reasons for consolidation.  Little theoretical or empirical research has examined the
impact of this consolidation.  We adapt an endogenous growth model of industry
structure and R&D to agricultural biotechnology and empirically estimate the model.
These empirical estimates, the main focus of the paper, indicate that industry
consolidation influences the amount and direction of research, which then feeds back to
influence industry structure.
Keywords:  Industrial organization and market structure in agricultural biotechnology,
simultaneous econometric model estimates of impacts of R&D.
                                                          
1 Financial Support for this research was provided under Cooperative Agreement No. 43-3AEL-9-80050
between USDA and Rutgers. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.2
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION INTENSITY IN AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECH
Abstract:  Consolidations and spin-offs in the agricultural biotechnology industry and
the growing links of multinational corporations with the food and feed industry has been
the subject of considerable discussion among academics, policy makers, consumers, and
farmers.  Most of the research by academic and government institutions has focused on
the reasons for consolidation.  Little theoretical or empirical research has examined the
impact of this consolidation.  We adapt an endogenous growth model of industry
structure and R&D to agricultural biotechnology and empirically estimate the model.
These empirical estimates, the main focus of the paper, indicate that industry
consolidation influences the amount and direction of research, which then feeds back to
influence industry structure.
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions in the plant biotechnology industry over the last decade
have been driven by the size and characteristics of research investments required to
develop new biotechnology products and by the strong patent system in the United States.
Many scholars and researchers are concerned that the concentration of patents, plant
germplasm, and markets for biotechnology among a few firms may be causing a decline
in the level of research and innovation in the industry (Barton, 1998).
Preliminary analysis by Brennan, Pray, and Courtmanche (1999) of the impacts of
concentration based on data on field trials of genetically engineered organisms indicates
that
•   research by large multinational firms appears to be increasing
•   new firm entry in the innovation market is declining,
•   research output by firms not in the top four in research output also appears to be
falling,
•   research efficiency, measured as the impact of research on agricultural production,
appears to be negatively related to firm size.
The drawback of that earlier analysis was that it was not able to identify whether the
identified trends were due to concentration or to other factors such as changes in expected3
market size, or the expected costs of developing new products.   The main focus of this
paper is the statistical estimation of the impacts of agricultural input industry
consolidation on the amount and direction of biotechnology research and how that feeds
back to industry structure, in a simultaneous model.
The Economic Model
The theoretical framework for this research goes back at least to Arrow (1962)
who argued that the payoff to a successful firm in an R&D race depends on the structure
of the market for its innovation.  Other authors (e.g. Phillips 1971) have shown that the
nature and structure of R&D might feed back and influence the structure of the market
for resulting innovations.  In Schumpeter’s writings on innovation, concentration in
markets leads to more R&D and influences market structure through “creative
destruction.”  In this paper, we empirically test a Schumpeterian model in which market
structure and R&D are jointly and endogenously determined (Levin and Reiss 1984).
The model we test has the additional advantage that it explicitly includes the influence of
public R&D on private research spending, and thus industry structure.
The model assumes firms maximize profit by choosing their level of output and
expenditures on R&D.  Firm i’s R&D (xi) shifts its own cost function down,
independently of the level of output chosen, and contributes to the industry level of R&D
(xi = X).  The unit cost of firm i is,
(1) ) , ( X x c c i i =
where c1, c2 < 0, and c11, c22 > 0, with positive, convex returns to own and industry R&D.
The spillover effect of own R&D on X is an external scale economy introducing the4
innovation appropriability issue that we discuss further with respect to the available data.
The problem of firm i is then to,
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where Q=qi is industry output, and p() is the inverse industry demand curve for biotech
seed varieties.
There is some evidence that agricultural input markets are oligopolistic with free-
entry (Barton 1998, Wann and Sexton 1992).  We therefore assume that firms make
Cournot conjectures regarding the output levels chosen by all other firms.  For firm i this
implies dQ/dqi = 1. Conjectural variations concerning the response of input industry R&D
to a change in one firm’s R&D level could be more complicated.  To leave open the full
range of possible conjectures concerning inter-firm strategic R&D behavior we assume
dX/dxi = i.  Later we explore how changes in  influence the empirical results.  Two
structural equations, corresponding to the first-order conditions of the profit maximizing
firms, simultaneously determine the two choice variables for symmetric industry
equilibria:
(3) 1/n = ε R,
(4) R/(1-R) = α  + γθ /n
where n is the number of firms in each input market, so 1/n is the Herfindahl index of
concentration (H) when firms are of equal size; and ε is the price elasticity of demand
faced by the firms (p/Qp1).  R is the ratio of industry R&D to sales.
In equation (4), (1-R) is the share of sales revenue that does not go to R&D in the
industry, and α is firm elasticity of unit cost with respect to own R&D (xi) holding
industry R&D constant.  Since R&D is assumed to be focused on cost-reducing5
innovations, α represents technological opportunity or the productivity of research.  Also
in (4), γ is the elasticity of unit cost with respect to input industry R&D (X) holding own
R&D constant.  This elasticity is a measure of the extent to which research by other
firms, spills over to affect the cost to an individual firm, the external scale economy.  As
long as the conjectural variation, , is positive, higher levels of γ will be associated with
greater R&D intensity.
2  The spillover will be related to the technologies involved and to
intellectual property rights.  Spillovers are interacted with concentration (1/n) in the
reduced form, so the estimated models will provide information concerning
substitutability and complementarity of spillovers and concentration.
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) show that the profit of each firm in an industry, in a
similar model, is zero with entry and exit.  Levin and Reiss (1984) also show that with
Cournot conjectures in output, equilibria exist under a wide range of parameter values for
equations (3) and (4).  Since the input market elasticities, α, ε, γ, and φ, are variables,
additional structure must be imposed to estimate the model empirically with time series
data.  Specifically it is assumed that both the underlying cost and inverse demand
functions have constant elasticities.  After taking natural logs of equation (3), the reduced
form empirical equations are:
(6) R = constant2 + β 2 α + β 3  (θγ H) + e2
                                                          
2 If the behavioral parameter  is negative, firms are free-riders to the extent that a one dollar increase in
R&D by firm i produces cutbacks in the R&D expenditures of the other firms of more than one dollar.
(5) Log H = constant1 + β 1 log (R) + e16
where R is R&D intensity, β 1,…,3 are estimated coefficients, and the e1,2 are residual
errors.  Equation (6) is not in logarithms.
Implementing the Model with Plant Biotechnology Data
It is not clear from previous research or other information that we have collected
on the agricultural input industry, whether increased concentration will increase or
decrease research intensity, defined as research output per unit of sales.  Concentration
could increase appropriability, which could increase R&D intensity.  Economies of scale
and scope in conducting research, and obtaining and defending intellectual property
rights on research results, could increase the productivity of a unit of research and could
increase research intensity.  However, if there is too much concentration the competitive
pressure to do research may be reduced.  Economies of scale in research obtained within
a firm may be offset by diseconomies of centralized bureaucratic management.  In
addition, risk aversion may increase with firm size, as small, high-risk entrepreneurial
firms are eliminated.
The amount of research, and past research success, may also drive changes in
agricultural input industry structure. The main incentive for expansion and concentration
is to spread-out the sunk cost of research, especially the large investments that are
required to do basic biotechnology research.  The growth of multinational agricultural
firms may have resulted from a desire to spread the cost of basic biotechnology research
over as large a share of the seed and plant protection industry as possible, to span as
many industries as possible, and as large a geographic area as possible.7
To test the impact of concentration on research intensity, our principle goal, we
have identified variables that measure concentration and research, and other important
variables that influence research intensity.  The variable names and sources of the data
are listed in Table 1.  Research intensity in the agricultural biotechnology industry is
measured by field trials of four genetically engineered crops divided by seed sales of each
crop, to control for market size. The theoretical model indicates that research may be
influenced by at least three groups of factors.
First, we consider factors that shift α  or technological opportunity: crop specific
public research and plant breeding; crop specific transformation possibilities; and public
goods.  Second, we consider factors affecting γ  or appropriability; hybrids, IPRs, public
biotechnology research, regulation, economies of scale and spillovers.
Finally, we consider factors that would affect expected sales of biotech products
other than current sales (approval of first biotech crops, first sales of biotech products,
outbreaks of pests, sales of substitutes, and development of substitutes).  Factors other
than in-house research that might affect mergers and the level of consolidation, include
exogenous breakthroughs in science (basic biotechnology research, and genomics), IPRs,
legal risks, market opportunities (synergies from “cross-selling”), and economies of scale
in marketing and research.
TABLE 1 HERE
The empirical model is then a simultaneous system of two linear equations which
can be estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS) for potatoes, rapeseed, sugarbeets,
and tomatoes.  A separate system is estimated for each crop with aggregate firm data8
because each crop has distinct industry characteristics.  Some of the characteristics of
these biotech crops can be seen in Table 2.
TABLE 2 HERE
A broad diversity of institutions conduct biotech research on these crops,
including food companies and cooperatives as well as both multinational and small
companies.  Universities also do public biotech research on these crops, often funded by
the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
These crops also rank near the top in numbers of field trials.  Results from the estimation
of the model are in Table 3.
TABLE 3 HERE
Results
Table 3 shows that both the industry concentration equation and the R&D
equation are correctly specified, as indicated by the diagnostic statistics.  The empirical
evidence is that industry concentration and R&D intensity are simultaneously determined
as in the theoretical endogenous growth model.  In addition, the estimated coefficients for
the concentration equations are all negative.  This indicates that there is an inverse
relationship between concentration and intensity for these dicotyledonous biotech crops.
The coefficients presented for the concentration equation are elasticities, so for potatoes,
canola, and tomatoes a one-unit increase in intensity arising from an additional field trial
or a one-unit decrease in sales (in $ thousands), indicates a 21-64% decrease in
concentration, or a proportional increase in the number of firms.  The response for canola9
is more elastic with a one-unit increase in intensity indicating a greater than 200%
decrease in concentration.
In the R&D equation, patents and industry concentration are complements for all
four crops.  The more concentrated the industry, the larger the positive impact of patents
and appropriability on intensity of R&D.  For tomatoes and canola, this complementarity
is between 4 and 24 times greater than for sugar beets and potatoes.  A few multinational
firms hold the important patents for tomatoes and canola.  The reported coefficients for
this spillover variable assumes Cournot-Nash conjectures  (θ  = 1) which implies firms are
not able to steal private research results directly from their competitors.  Assuming that
firms are subject to inter-firm spillovers (θ  < 1) increases the size of the reported
coefficient on the interaction term proportionately.
Public R&D has a small positive and significant effect for all of the crops except
for beets, where the effect is negative and significant.  Canola has four to five times the
public research lag of potatoes or tomatoes.  Disregarding the lags, a public scientist-year
of research on tomatoes has a greater impact on tomato private research than public
research has on private for the other crops.  The negative coefficient on sugar beets
indicates that the bureaucracy is being maintained at the Department of Agriculture, but
scientists have been moved out of research on beets and no public field trials are
currently underway.
FIGURE 1 HERE
To help explain these results, the historical pattern of biotechnology research can
be seen in figure 1.  This pattern indicates that a combination of exogenous advances in10
biotechnology and expected market size, based on the size of the current seed market, and
the early adoption of genetically engineered (GE) crops, help to explain the trends in
research intensity and concentration.
The number of field trials in the early stages of biotech growth in the crops in
figure 1 was determined primarily by technological opportunity with some influence of
expectations about markets.  Plants that are dicotyledons – tobacco, tomatoes, cotton,
soybeans, potatoes, sugarbeets, and rapeseed/canola – could be transformed much earlier
and are still more easily and cheaply transformed than the grains (corn, wheat, and rice)
which are monocotyledons.
3  Applied research as measured by field trials was first
conducted on dicots except for corn, which has a large market potential.  The first four
crops with field trials were all dicots and of the first 7 crops, only corn is a monocot
4.
Once field trials began, their numbers grew very rapidly for a few years and then
leveled off or declined.  The number of trials when they leveled off, and whether they
then declined or not, was largely determined by expected demand.  Expected market size
for genetically engineered seed is a function of seed sales of the crop, successful adoption
of genetically engineered crops by farmers, the cost savings from unnecessary pesticides,
and the increased value of the commodity due to quality improvements, and other factors.
Research intensity increases in all crops in the years after the first field trials.  In
the three crops in which GE varieties have been very popular in the U.S. – soybeans,
corn, and cotton – the number of field trials per value of seed sales rebounds from low
points in 1995 or 1996.  The other crop that has a large increase in trials is
                                                          
3 The process for transforming monocots has primarily been with the biolistic gun, which was and still is
much less efficient and reliable than the agrobacterium process, which has only recently been modified to
be useful for monocots.11
rapeseed/canola that benefited from large sales of GE varieties in Canada.  In contrast,
one early GE entrant which was a commercial failure – extended shelf life or “flavor-
saver” tomatoes – shows declining research intensity after 1995 and continues to decline
to the present.  The model estimates the magnitude of the resulting increase in
concentration. The other crops in this study – potatoes and sugarbeets– have not had
many years of field trials and still seem to be in an initial phase of steadily increasing
research intensity, but our parameter estimates robustly show the same negative
relationship between intensity and concentration, with smaller estimated elasticities.
Conclusions
The empirical results from the simultaneous endogenous growth model we
estimate, indicate an inverse relationship between firm concentration in seed markets and
R&D intensity in that market.   One interpretation of this result is that increased
competition in R&D, as indicated by low levels of concentration in field trials and the
participation of several competing firms in the GMO approval process, is positively
related to R&D intensity, or the ratio of field trials to sales.  One would expect more
firms to have more field trials, but also more sales, so it is interesting that concentration
and R&D intensity have an unambiguously negative simultaneous relationship for each
of these biotech crops.  Concentration may be important to policymakers concerned with
maintaining high levels research activity and a steady supply of important new
agricultural input products.
A possible source of bias in these results may be introduced by the first few years
of field trials.   Our estimates could be biased because in the early periods, both the
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 The sequence of first field trials in this study was: 1987 tomato; 1989 cotton, soybeans, potatoes; 199012
number of firms entering the individual seed industries and the number of field trials
could be related to breakthroughs in biotechnology science, that are unmeasured and
hence omitted variables.   Future work will expand the coverage of crops and investigate
the possibility of fitting a simultaneous panel data model.
                                                                                                                                                                            
corn; 1991 rapeseed/canola; 1993 sugareets; 1994 wheat; and 1996 rice.13
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 Table 1. Plant Biotechnology Industry Data for 1989 to 1998.
Variable Name Variable How to measure Source
Research Intensity
Private biotech R&D per
unit of seed sales













Public research expenditure SMYs by commodity CRIS
Genetic transformation
possibilities
Dummy for crops that are
dicots which can be relatively
easily transformed




Hybrids (and cotton) Dummy for hybrids Corn, cotton, beets,
Biotech patents Firm patents by crop U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office
Public field trials Public as % field trials
Expected market
First GMO approval Dummy for year of first
deregulation by firm
APHIS
Adoption of GMOs by
farmers
% of crop planted with GMOs USDA (NASS)
Seed sales by crop Value of sales of seeds by year ERS
Concentration
R&D concentration 1/ number of firms conducting
field trials on a crop
Calculated from APHIS
data




*These include firms owned by multinational chemical or pharmaceutical companies e.g. Monsanto,
DuPont, Novartis, Agrevo, Astra/Zeneca, and Dow.15











Institutions Conducting Field Trials




1,099 17 4 146 (7) Mainly Multinational Input Firms
Sugarbeets 1,529 67 2 104(10) Multinationals (no Universities)
Tomatoes 420 42 11 485 (4) Food companies, Vegetable Seed
Companies, Multinational Input
Firms, and Universities16
Table 3. Two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimates of dicotyledonous crop structural
equations for 1987-1998.
Industry Concentration Equation R&D Equation
Regressors
Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic
POTATOES  (obs=10)
      R&D Intensity -0.27 -2.72**
      Patents*Concentration  0.028 6.74**
      Public R&D (4 year lag)   0.007 3.78**
      Constant -1.39 -5.86** -0.88 -3.47**
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.55 2.18
Akaike Info. Criterion 1.08 -2.29
CANOLA OILSEED (obs=8)
      R&D Intensity -2.09 -5.37**
      Patents*Concentration 0.68 2.46*
      PublicR&D(20 year lag) 0.033 2.73**
      Constant
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.52 1.83
Akaike Info. Criterion 2.42 3.38
SUGAR BEETS  (obs=6)
      R&D Intensity -0.21 -2.22*
      Patents*Concentration  0.12 3.81**
      Public R&D (2 year lag) -0.015 -3.95**
      Constant -1.77 -8.49** 1.24 3.72**
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.13 2.21
Akaike Info. Criterion - .10 - 2.53
TOMATOES  (obs=12)
      R&D Intensity -0.64 -8.18**
      Patents*Concentration 0.49 1.88*
      Public R&D (5 year lag) 0.059 2.85**
      Constant -2.43 -24.78** -33.70 -2.79**
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.23 2.01
Akaike Info. Criterion .231 2.50
* Significant at 90% confidence level.
** Significant at 99% confidence level.17









1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
TOMINT
BEETINT
CORNINT
COTINT
POTINT
RAPINT
RICEINT
SOYINT
WHINT